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Investment decisions are inherently forward-looking.  The payoff of acquiring capital goods, particularly
long-lived capital goods, is governed almost exclusively by events in the far future.  Because the timing
of the investment itself does not affect future payoffs, there are strong incentives to delay or accelerate
investment to take advantage of predictable intertemporal variations in cost.  For sufficiently long-lived
capital goods, these incentives are so strong that the intertemporal elasticity of investment demand
is nearly infinite.  As a consequence, for a temporary tax change, the shadow price of long-lived capital
goods must reflect the full tax subsidy regardless of the elasticity of investment supply.  While price
data provide no information on the elasticity of supply, they can reveal the extent to which adjustment
costs are internal or external to the firm.  In contrast, the elasticity of investment supply can be inferred
from quantity data alone. The bonus depreciation allowance passed in 2002 and increased in 2003
presents an opportunity to test the sharp predictions of neoclassical investment theory.  In the law,
certain types of long-lived capital goods qualify for substantial tax subsides while others do not.  The
data show that investment in qualified properties was substantially higher than for unqualified property.
The estimated elasticity of investment supply is high--between 10 and 20.  Market prices do not react
to the subsidy as the theory dictates.  This suggests either that internal (unmeasured) adjustment costs
play a significant role or that measurement problems in the price data effectively conceal the price
changes. While the policy noticeably increased investment in types of capital that benefited substantially
from bonus depreciation, the aggregate effects of the policy were modest.  The analysis suggests that
the policy may have increased output by roughly 0.1 percent to 0.2 percent and increased employment
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Even modest reductions in the after-tax cost of capital purchases provide strong 
incentives for increased investment.  Indeed, for temporary investment tax subsidies that 
apply to long-lived capital goods the incentive to invest is essentially infinite.  This paper 
presents a general equilibrium analysis of temporary changes in taxes that affect the 
incentive to invest.  Though the paper is motivated by recent changes in tax law, the 
analysis has general implications for the equilibrium effects of temporary tax incentives.   
Many results flow from a basic property of investment decisions:  If firms are 
sufficiently forward-looking and investment goods are sufficiently long-lived, the 
elasticity of investment demand is nearly infinite with respect to temporary changes in 
cost.  This property rests directly on the forward-looking nature of investment.  Since the 
value of such an investment is anchored by long-run factors, variations in the timing of 
these investments have only minor consequences for their eventual payoffs.  As a result, 
the decision of when to invest is highly sensitive to temporary changes in costs.  
This insight leads to several results concerning temporary investment tax 
incentives.  First, if the supply of investment goods is highly elastic in the short run, the 
quantity of investment will react dramatically to such policies.  Second, temporary tax 
changes are necessarily accompanied by offsetting changes in the pre-tax shadow price of 
investment goods. In equilibrium the pre-tax shadow price of investment goods must 
move one-for-one with the tax subsidy regardless of the elasticity of investment supply.  
Observing price increases following a temporary tax incentive is therefore not 
evidence that the supply of investment is relatively inelastic.  Of course, the elasticity of 
investment supply does matter for the equilibrium determination of quantity.  Because 
economic theory dictates that the underlying shadow price of investment moves one-for-
one with a temporary tax subsidy, the elasticity of supply can be inferred from quantity 
data alone.   
We test the theory by examining disaggregate investment data following the 2002 
and 2003 tax bills.  These bills provided temporarily accelerated depreciation, called 
bonus depreciation that allowed firms to immediately deduct an increased fraction of 
their investment.  Under the 2002 bill firms could immediately deduct 30 percent of 
investment and then depreciate the remaining 70 percent under the standard depreciation   2
schedule.  Under the 2003 bill, the immediate deduction increased to 50 percent.  This 
investment subsidy was explicitly temporary.  Only investments made through 2004 
qualified for this tax treatment.  
Using cross-section data on investment expenditures, we estimate the elasticity of 
supply for investment.  The data clearly show that the policy had a stimulative impact on 
investment in capital that benefited most from the bonus depreciation.  Our estimates of 
the elasticity of supply are between 10 and 20.  Market prices, on the other hand, show 
little if any tendency to increase in the short run.   
We use our estimates of the supply elasticity together with the general equilibrium 
model to infer the likely aggregate effects of the policy.  Our calculations suggest that, 
while their aggregate effects were probably modest, the 2002 and 2003 bonus 
depreciation policies had noticeable effects on the economy.  For the U.S. economy as a 
whole, these policies may have increased GDP by $10 to $20 billion and may have been 
responsible for the creation of 100,000 to 200,000 jobs.   
Section II presents the general equilibrium model used in our analysis.  Section III 
presents some general results for temporary investment tax incentives and discusses their 
econometric implications.  Section IV describes the tax changes called for by the 2002 
and 2003 laws.  Section V estimates the parameters of our model using the variation in 
the data from the policy changes.  Section VI uses the model and our estimates to 
quantify the aggregate effects of the policy.  Section VII offers our conclusions.  
 
II. MODEL 
In this section we present the general equilibrium model which we use to analyze 
temporary investment tax subsidies.  The model allows for a general type of investment 
tax subsidy.  Later we modify the model to consider bonus depreciation allowances like 
those included in the 2002 and 2003 tax bills.  We use the model to present some basic 
properties of temporary investment tax subsidies and also to motivate our empirical 
research design.  Later we use the model to quantify the aggregate effects of the policy.  
The model has a basic neoclassical structure.  We begin with the household sector.  
   3
2.1 Households 
Households behave competitively and maximize utility subject to their budget 
constraints.  Households derive utility from consumption (Ct) and disutility from labor 
(Nt).  Their utility functions take the form  
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where η  is the Frisch labor supply elasticity, σ  is the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution for consumption, and φ  is a scaling parameter.   
The households own the entire capital stock.  Because the tax policies we analyze 
provide different incentives for different types of capital, we include several different 
types of capital in the model.  Let  1,..., mM = be an index of capital types.  For each type 
m, let 
m δ  be the economic rate of depreciation, and let 
m K  be the stock of capital.  New 
capital goods are produced with units of the consumption good (the numeraire) as inputs.  
Let the total cost of producing 
m
t I  units of type m capital be  ()
mm m
tt I Φ =Φ .  The real 
marginal cost of such capital is  () () () /
mm m m m m
tt t t I II ϕϕ == ∂Φ ∂  .  We assume that 
()
mm
t I ϕ  is increasing.  For the numerical simulations and for our empirical analysis we 
assume that the functions  ()
mm
t I ϕ  are given by  
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where 
m I  is the steady state level of investment for type m capital.  Thus, the elasticity of 
supply is ξ  and the steady state real relative price is one.
1  These costs can be interpreted 
as external costs which are reflected in the market price of the good or as adjustment 
costs which are internal to the firm and thus not reflected in the market price (Mussa 
[1977]).   
Abstracting from many issues of corporate finance, we assume that all taxes are 
paid by the household.  The household’s labor and capital income are both subject to 
                                                 
1 Our functional form differs from Hayashi’s [1982] assumptions that require zero-degree homogeneity in 
the investment/capital ratio.  Holding the capital stock fixed one can show that, if γ  is the adjustment cost 
parameter in the Hayashi form (i.e., γ = dQ / d(I / K )), then our elasticity is ξ = (γ δ )
-1
.     4
distortionary taxation.  
N τ is the tax rate on labor income.  Capital income is taxed twice 
—once as business profit and again when capital income is distributed to the households.  
π τ
 is the tax rate on profit, and 
d τ  is the tax rate on the distribution of capital income 
(dividends and capital gains taxes).  
The household chooses  1 , ,  ,
m
ttt NCK +  and 
m
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and 
  () 1 1 , for all 
mmm m
tt t KK I m δ + = − + . (4) 
Here 
m
t ζ  is the total effective subsidy on new purchases of type m capital, and includes 
the value of depreciation deductions and any investment tax credits.
 2  Wt is the real wage.  
m
t R  is the real rental price of type m capital. 
m
t I  denotes investment in new type m 
capital.  Tt is a lump-sum transfer.  St is the household’s holding of government debt in 
one-period real bonds and rt is the real interest rate. 
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where (7) and (8) hold for all m.  The variable 
m
t q , the Lagrange multiplier on constraint 
(4), is the shadow value of an additional unit of type m capital.  Equation (7) is the first-
                                                 
2 The full cost of investment is subject to the tax subsidy.  Depreciation deductions are allowed for internal 
adjustment costs that are paid out of pocket by the firm.  By law, such payments are to be depreciated along 
with the purchase price.     5
order condition for the choice of  1
m
t K +  and equation (8) is the first-order condition for the 
choice of 
m
t I .  Equation  (8) relates the shadow value of capital 
m
t q  to the pre-tax shadow 
price of capital 
m
t ϕ .
3   
 
2.2 Firms 
Firms produce the numeraire good with a constant returns to scale production function.  
For simplicity we take the production function to be a generalized Cobb-Douglas form  
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Firms rent capital from the household.  Each period, the firms choose 
m
t K  and  t N  taking 
the rental prices 
m
t R  and the real wage  t W  as given.  Profit maximization implies that the 
marginal product of each input equals its marginal cost.  
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2.3 Government Spending and Market Clearing 
The government levies taxes and consumes units of the numeraire good.  In our analysis, 
government spending  t G  is constant each period.  The government’s intertemporal 
budget constraint must hold in equilibrium.  This constraint is 
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− .  Below, we argue that in response to temporary tax policies, movements in q
m  are negligible.  
Because prices and marginal utility change in response to such policies, Q
m will change even though q
m 
will not.   6






= += ∏  for t = 0.  Like most tax changes, the 
policies we consider have revenue consequences.  We assume that the budget is balanced 
with offsetting variations in the lump-sum transfers  t T .  Because these transfers are lump-
sum, their precise timing is irrelevant.  
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III. TEMPORARY INVESTMENT TAX INCENTIVES 
We now present some fundamental properties of temporary investment tax incentives.  
This analysis sheds light on the basic economic incentives involved in such policies and 
motivates for our empirical analysis of the 2002 and 2003 investment policies.   
Let the economy begin in the steady state.  Suppose the government then credibly 
announces a temporary investment tax subsidy financed with variations in the lump-sum 
transfer T.  The tax subsidy temporarily increases 
m
t ζ  for certain (or perhaps all) 
investment goods.  The precise form of the subsidy is not important at this point; it could 
be an investment tax credit, a bonus depreciation allowance, etc.   
 
3.1 Short-Run Approximations for Long-Lived Investment Goods  
Although the model is complicated, two short-run approximations yield sharp, analytical 
results about the effects of temporary investment subsidies.  The accuracy of these 
approximations rests on two conditions:  First the policy must be temporary.  Second, the 
approximations are most accurate for long-lived investment goods, that is, goods with 
low economic rates of depreciation.  The approximations are less accurate and potentially 
quite misleading for long lasting changes in policy or for capital that depreciates rapidly.  
The exact solution to the model is complicated because it has both backward- and 
forward-looking variables.  For sufficiently temporary tax changes, it is a good 
approximation to replace the forward-looking variables 
m
t q , and the backward-looking   7
variables 
m
t K , with their associated steady state values  and 
mm qK .  Replacing the capital 
stock with its steady state value is standard in many settings.  The stock of long-lived 
capital is much bigger than the flow and thus changes only slightly in the short run.  
Specifically, the percent change in the capital stock is approximately 
m δ  times the 
percentage change in investment. (With balanced growth it would be 
m δ  plus the growth 
rate.) 
The justification for approximating 
m
t q  with its steady state value is more subtle.  
Expanding equation (7), we can write 
m
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Because the policy change is temporary, the system will eventually return to its steady 
state.  While this may take some time, most of the terms in the brackets, particularly 
those in the future, remain close to their steady state values.  Put differently, the 
difference between 
m
t q  and its steady state level 
m q  comes entirely from the first several 
terms in the expansion—the short-run terms.  Provided that agents are sufficiently patient 
(i.e., that β  is close to 1) and that depreciation is sufficiently slow (i.e., 
m δ  is sufficiently 
low), the future terms dominate this expression and the short-run behavior of the system 
has only minor influences on 
m
t q .  
This approximation has a natural economic interpretation.  The decision to invest 
is inherently forward-looking.  As such, the benefits from investment are anchored by 
future, long-run considerations.  As long as the far future is only mildly influenced by 
temporary policies, the benefit to any given investment is independent of the short run.  
 
3.2 Response of Investment to Temporary Tax Subsidies  
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium response of the price and quantity of 
investment goods to temporary tax subsidies.  Conventional supply and demand 
reasoning can be misleading because capital is durable and therefore subject to a stock 
demand.  Expectations about the future dominate current investment decisions.  Our 
analysis should come as no surprise to careful readers of Jorgenson [1963], Abel [1982],   8
Summers [1985], or indeed, of Lucas’s [1976] critique, which took “investment demand” 
as an example.  As an example of how misleading conventional supply and demand 
reasoning can be, we show that in response to a temporary tax subsidy, the shadow price 
of investment goods moves one-for-one with the investment subsidy regardless of the 
elasticity of investment supply.  This result has important econometric implications.   
  In our model, equation (2) gives the real pre-tax price of new type m capital 
m
t ϕ  
which includes all of the costs of investment.  It includes costs of investment that are 
external to the firm (the price of the good for instance) and any adjustment costs that are 
internal to the firm (installation costs, disruption and so forth).  Figure 1 plots this 
equation for a single type of capital.  The total pre-tax price of investment  t ϕ  is on the 
vertical axis and the quantity of investment  t I  is on the horizontal axis.  The slope of this 
curve is governed by the elasticity ξ .  
Equation (8) relates the shadow price of capital  t ϕ  to its shadow value  t q , the 
marginal utility of resources 
1
t C
σ −  , and the tax subsidy (1 ) t ζ − .  Using our short-run 
approximation,  t qq ≈ , we have an equation relating the pre-tax price of investment 
goods to the tax subsidy and the marginal utility of consumption.  Note that this equation 
does not involve the rate of investment.  Plotting equation (8) gives a horizontal line with 
shift variables C and ζ .   
The equilibrium price and rate of investment for each m is determined by the 
















which is independent of elasticity of supply and the quantity of investment.  If the policy 
does not change aggregate consumption, then the shadow price of capital changes one-
for-one with the subsidy.  If the policy does have aggregate effects, all shadow prices 
move depending on the change in the marginal utility of consumption.  In this case, 
changes in the relative pre-tax shadow prices fully reflect any differences in tax subsidies   9
(the relative after-tax shadow prices are unchanged).
4  Thus, for temporary tax subsidies, 
the pre-tax price of long-lived investment goods should fully reflect the tax subsidy 
regardless of the rate at which the marginal costs of investment rises.  
Let  t v   be the percent deviation of a variable v from its steady state value, that is, 
/ tt vd v v ≡  .  Then, using the constancy of 
m
t q  under a temporary tax subsidy, condition 
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where 
m
t dζ  is the change in the investment subsidy.  If the tax subsidy has no aggregate 
effects, 0 t C =   so the elasticity of investment supply ξ  can be inferred directly from the 
change in investment.  If there are general equilibrium effects, one must control for the 
change in aggregate consumption to make this inference. 
The derivation of equations (14) and (15) requires very few assumptions.  Among 
other things, they require no reference to the production function, the marginal product of 
capital, or the supply and demand for labor.  All that is required is a stable supply curve 
and the assumption that the investment is long-lived and that the policy is (sufficiently) 
temporary.  (Equation (16) requires a particular form for the marginal utility of 
consumption, though this assumption can be relaxed.  See Section V.)  Because the 
structural relationships do not require many strong assumptions, our theoretical 
conclusions which form the basis for our econometric analysis, are robust to many 
different sources of misspecification.   
 
3.3 Accuracy of the Approximation.  
The approximations  t qq ≈  and  t KK ≈  are exactly true only for either arbitrarily short-
lived policies or for arbitrarily low depreciation rates (and discount rates).  For realistic 
policy durations and for real world depreciation rates, these approximations are 
imperfect.  To evaluate the accuracy of our approximations, we present a simple example 
                                                 
4 This finding has antecedents in the Q-theoretical investment literature, which typically considers  partial 
equilibrium settings.  Abel [1982] shows that an instantaneous, temporary tax change has no effect on after-
tax Q (which he calls q
* ).  Since after-tax Q is constant, pre-tax Q fully reflects the policy change. (See 
also Hayashi [1982], Summers [1981, 1985], and Auerbach and Hines [1987].)   10
of the approximation for a variety of depreciation rates and policy durations.  For 
simplicity we focus on a single type of capital.  We take the production function to be 
t Ak
α and we hold the real interest rate and the marginal utility of consumption constant.  
The firm maximizes the discounted value of after-tax profits.  We assume that  0.02 r =  
(annually) and  0.35 α = .  The supply of investment is given by equation (2).   
  Table 1 presents the equilibrium change in the shadow price of capital goods ϕ in 
response to an investment tax subsidy of one percent ( .01 ζ = ).  Our approximation says 
that the change should be one percent (or equivalently that the change in the shadow 
value q should be zero).   
 Consider  a  long-lived capital good with an annual depreciation rate of two percent 
(comparable to many structures).  If the elasticity of supply is 1.00 then, for a subsidy 
that lasts one year, the price rises by 0.993 percent.  The change in the shadow value (not 
reported) is simply the difference between the subsidy and the price change.  Thus the 
percent change in q for this case is -0.007 percent.  For higher elasticities, the 
approximation deteriorates.  If  10 ξ = , the change in ϕ is 0.954 percent.  As the 
discussion above suggests, the approximation is best for very temporary policies or very 
long-lived durables.  Moreover, that the approximation does not hold for longer-duration 
policies with capital that depreciates rapidly is exactly what the theory predicts. 
 
3.4 Implications for Observed Prices and User Cost 
Price increases are a necessary accompaniment of a temporary investment subsidy.  Thus, 
observing increased investment goods prices following a temporary tax subsidy is not 
evidence of a relatively inelastic supply curve.  Theory suggests that the pre-tax price 
should rise roughly one-for-one with the investment subsidy regardless of the elasticity.  
Because theory has such sharp implications for the equilibrium determination of prices, it 
is useful to consider what conclusions, if any, could be drawn from price data.   
Recall that the shadow price of investment goods reflects both external and 
internal marginal costs of new investment.  This distinction does not matter for the 
determination of investment, but it does matter for relating the predictions of the model to 
observations in the data, which capture only market (i.e., external) prices.  Let 
m
t p  be the   11
market price of type m investment goods.  We assume that internal adjustment costs in 
steady state are zero and that changes in the shadow cost are a reflection of changes in 
external and internal adjustment costs.  If θ  is the fraction of external adjustment costs,  
  () 11 .
mm
tt p θϕ =+ −  (16) 
Movements in the shadow price affect market prices only to the extent that adjustment 
cost are external to the firm.  If θ  were 1 so that all investment adjustment costs were 
external, then we could test neoclassical investment theory by observing whether prices 
increased one-for-one with a temporary tax subsidy.  Alternatively, without knowledge of 
the share of external adjustment costs, price data can be used to estimate θ .  Clearly, 
without knowledge of θ , price data cannot be used to estimate the elasticity of supply.   
  Our work relates to Goolsbee’s [1998] analysis of the effect of investment 
incentives on prices of investment goods.  He finds that increases in the Investment Tax 
Credit (ITC) lead to increases in the price of equipment.  Goolsbee concludes that the 
price increases indicate that the supply of investment is relatively inelastic.  Our analysis 
leads to a different interpretation.  Because the price elasticity of investment demand is 
essentially infinite for long-lived capital, the equilibrium price is independent of the 
supply elasticity.  Price is determined by investment demand alone. 
  Often, the analysis of tax policy focuses on the user cost of capital.
5  Though the 
Jorgensonian user cost relationship holds in our model, it is uninformative for studying 
the effects of temporary investment tax subsidies.  Using (6), (7) and (8), we can write 
the user cost expression as 
  () () 11
11 1
1
(1 )(1 ) 1 1
1
mm
tt dm m m m m
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, (17) 
where  () 11 tt t x xx ++ Δ≡ − .  This says simply that the after-tax marginal product of capital 
equals the user cost (the right had side of (17)).  In certain instances (17) can be used 
directly to analyze the effects of policy changes.  For instance, ceteris paribus, an 
increase in 
m
t ζ  implies a lower after tax marginal product of capital.  For the marginal 
product to decrease, the capital stock must rise, so net investment must increase 
                                                 
5 For example, Cohen, Hansen, and Hassett [2002] use this approach to analyze the potential impact of the 
bonus depreciation policies that we consider later in this paper.  They simulate the responses to change in 
user cost under the assumption that prices are constant.   12
temporarily.  Notice, however, that many assumptions are required to read the effect of 
the policy from expression (17). The real interest rate  t r , and the real price of new capital 
m
t ϕ  must remain constant.  In addition, to the extent that the marginal product of type m 
capital interacts with other factors of production, employment and other capital inputs 
must also be held constant.  In short, to use (17) for policy analysis requires that the 
policy in question has very limited (if any) equilibrium effects.   
The temporary investment tax subsidies that we analyze in this paper provide a 
stark illustration of this point.  Consider a temporary investment tax incentive that has no 
effect on aggregate consumption ( t CC ≈ ).  For long-lived capital goods, 
mm
t qq ≈ , 
which implies that 
m
t ϕ  fully reflects the tax subsidy 
m
t ζ .  Hence,  1
mm
tt ϕζ ⎡ ⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  is constant 
and the equilibrium user cost of capital is unaffected by the policy.  Equation (17) 
determines the demand for capital.  Temporary investment tax subsidies change neither 
the demand for, nor the supply of, capital.  Instead, they change investment, that is, the 
timing of when capital is acquired.  For long-lived capital goods, the user cost formula 
provides no guidance for analyzing such policy changes.  
 
IV. BONUS DEPRECIATION  
We use the temporary bonus depreciation allowances provided in the 2002 and 2003 tax 
bills to study the model’s predictions.  In this section we describe the normal treatment of 
depreciation in the U.S. Tax Code as well as the modifications provided in the 2002 and 
2003 laws.  We then use our model to analyze the bonus depreciation policies.  Our aim 
is to re-derive equation (15) for the special case of bonus depreciation policy.  The 
analysis provides the econometric relationships which we use in Section V.   
 
4.1 The Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System 
Under the U.S. tax code, depreciation deductions for tax purposes are specified by the 
Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS).  For each type of property, 
MACRS specifies a recovery period (R) and a depreciation method (200 percent 
declining balance, 150 percent declining balance, or straight-line depreciation.)  See the 
appendix for more details on MACRS.  The recovery period specifies how long it takes to   13
amortize the investment.  Recovery periods differ substantially across investments and 
are supposed to correspond roughly with the productive life of the property.  Table 2 lists 
selected types of property and their recovery periods.  The recovery period for general 
equipment is 7 years.  Vehicles have 5-year recovery periods.  Non-residential real 
property, which includes most business structures, is depreciated over 39-years, and so 
on.   
 
4.2 Bonus Depreciation in the 2002 and 2003 Tax Bills 
On March 9, 2002, the President signed the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act 
(JCWAA) into effect.  The most prominent provisions in JCWAA were intended to ease 
the tax burden on businesses and thereby stimulate investment.  These provisions came in 
the form of increased depreciation allowances for certain types of business investments. 
The 2002 law introduced bonus depreciation, which allowed firms to deduct 30 
percent of the costs of investment from their taxable income in the first year of the 
recovery period.  The remaining 70 percent was depreciated over the standard recovery 
period in accordance with MACRS.  The 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA), signed on May 28, 2003, increased the bonus depreciation 
to 50 percent.  Under both laws, to qualify for the bonus depreciation allowance, property 
had to be depreciable under MACRS and had to have a recovery period of 20 years or 
less.  In addition, the property must have been placed in service after September 11, 2001 
and prior to January 1, 2005.  Firms that anticipated the policy would rationally increase 
investment in the third quarter in 2001.
6  We will return to the issue of the timing of the 
policy when we present our results. 
To illustrate, suppose a business buys a car and depreciates it according to 
MACRS.  The recovery period for cars is five years and the normal MACRS depreciation 
in the first year is 20 percent.  The 2002 law allows the firm to first deduct 30 percent and 
then depreciate the remaining 70 percent according to MACRS.  The deduction in the 
first year is then 44 percent (30% .2(70%) + ).   
Both the 2002 and 2003 laws included investment incentives targeted at small 
                                                 
6 JCWAA requires that the property be acquired (but not necessarily placed in service) after September 11, 
2004.  JGTRRA eliminated this requirement.     14
businesses that complicate the analysis.  Prior to JCWAA, the U.S. tax system allowed 
firms to expense investment up to $24,000 annually under Section 179 of the tax code.  
The 2002 law increased this limit to $25,000.  The 2003 law increased the 179 exemption 
to $100,000 through the end of  2005.  Like the bonus depreciation allowance, this 
exemption only applied to property with a recovery period of no more than 20 years.
7 
 
4.3. Quantifying Accelerated Depreciation 
Hall and Jorgenson [1967] analyze depreciation allowances by assuming that the firm 
immediately recovers the present discounted value of depreciation deductions when it 
invests.  For any path of depreciation deductions Dj, the present discounted value of the 











+ ∑ , (18) 
where i is the nominal interest rate.  Let X be the tax reduction from purchasing a unit of 
investment.
8  The total tax reduction per dollar of investment from regular depreciation 
allowances is () 1
d X z
π ττ = − . If this were the only investment subsidy, then the tax 
subsidy defined in Section III would be  X ζ = .  Table 3, Panel A shows calculations of 
the present discounted value of depreciation deductions z for various MACRS recovery 
periods.   
Table 3, Panel B shows the effects of the bonus depreciation policy measured as 
the change in z times the statutory corporate tax rate.  For property with very short 
recovery periods, the investment subsidy is small.  For five-year property the 50 percent 
bonus depreciation reduces the cost of investment by at most 2.88 percent.  For longer 
recovery periods the bonus is worth more.  20-year properties get a subsidy between 5 
and 10 percent with the 50 percent bonus depreciation deduction.   
 
                                                 
7 The bills also had other provisions.  Because these provisions do not have strong effects across types of 
capital, we do not analyze them in this paper.  For an analysis of the income tax provisions of the 2001 and 
2003 tax policies, see House and Shapiro [forthcoming]. 
8 The discounted value is calculated with the nominal interest rate because tax depreciation allowances are 
not indexed for inflation.     15
4.4 Modeling Bonus Depreciation  
Because doing so would entail tracking the vintage structure of investment in each capital 
type, solving the model with the exact schedule of depreciation deductions Dj would be 
excessively complicated.  To get a tractable, recursive representation we approximate 
each tax depreciation schedule with a constant geometric rate  ˆm δ .  We use this 
approximation again when we simulate the model in Section VI.  In the econometric 
work in Section V, we use the exact MACRS depreciation schedules to calculate z as in 
equation (18).   
Using the geometric approximation, MACRS without the bonus depreciation 
reduces the cost of investment by 
m
t X  where 
m
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If the tax depreciation rate on type m capital is sufficiently low, and if the policy is 
temporary, arguments like those in Section III permit us to approximate 
1
m
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≈−  (20) 
Let 
m
t λ  denote a bonus depreciation allowance for type m capital.  As in the actual 
legislation, for every dollar of investment in such capital, firms write off 
m
t λ  immediately 
and the remaining (1
m
t λ − ) is depreciated according to the usual depreciation schedule.  
The total subsidy on investment in type m capital 
m
t ζ  is then  
  () () 11 .
mm d m m
tt t t t t X
π ζλ τ τ λ = − + −  (21)   16
This calculation relies on the assumption that firms pay at least some income tax.  
Furthermore, as long as the firm is not exclusively debt financed, the subsidy is effective.  
That is, the analysis is unchanged even if the marginal investments are debt financed.  
Using (20) and our short-run approximations for q and K, we can write (15) as  
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  . (22) 
The first term is the direct change in investment due to bonus depreciation.  As before, 
the second term captures the extent to which the policy has aggregate effects.  If bonus 
depreciation applies broadly, employment will increase (because the policy effectively 
increases the real wage) and consumption will decrease (as households substitute toward 
subsidized investment).
9   
The real relative prices of investment goods are also affected by the policy.  
Because  () 1
mm
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  . (23) 
As in Section III, this equation is independent of the elasticity of the supply of investment 
goods.  The first term is the discounted value of the tax subsidy itself.  In the absence of 
changes in  t C  ,  the shadow price of investment goods increases one-for-one with the tax 
subsidy.   
Equations (22) and (23) can be used to illustrate the predicted effects of bonus 
depreciation.  Figure 2 plots deviations in investment and real relative prices implied by 
(22) and (23) against the tax depreciation rate for ten different types of capital goods for 
the quarters immediately after the legislation: 2002:2 and 2003:3.  To generate the 
                                                 
9 Typically increases in wages have offsetting income and substitution effects.  In this case however, the 
temporary nature of the policy together with the forward looking behavior of the household implies that the 
income effect is negligible (a fact embodied in our short-run approximations).  Using (5), (9), (11), (13), 



































⎛⎞ −− ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⋅ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ −− ⎝⎠
= ≥
⎧⎫ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ − ++ + ⎟⎟ ⎨⎬ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎪⎪ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
∑
∑
   
The inequality is strict as long as τ
π < 1, σ < ∞, η  > 0 and as long as z
m < 1. The first-order approximation 
of condition (5) then gives  ( )
1 0 tt CN ηα σ
− =− + ≤   .     17
figures, we chose parameter values for  , 
d π ττ  and σ  and calculated z
m for each type of 
capital according to the approximate MACRS tax depreciation rates.  We set  t C   to 
−0.054 percent in 2002:2 and −0.077 percent in 2003:3.  (These parameter values and 
changes in consumption are taken from the simulations of the model presented in Section 
VI.)  We used the bonus depreciation rates 
m
t λ  provided by the law and set ξ  to 15 which 
is roughly the midpoint of the estimates we get in the next section.  In Figure 2, each 
point represents the log deviation from steady state of a particular type of capital.  Solid 
circles indicate capital types that qualify for bonus depreciation.  Empty circles indicate 
capital types that do not qualify.   
  The top panels show the changes in real investment spending immediately after 
the 2002 and 2003 laws go into effect.  Properties with the lowest tax depreciation rates 
do not qualify for the depreciation allowance.  Because of the small aggregate effects of 
diverting resources to investment in qualified capital, investment in unqualified types  
falls slightly.  Investment jumps up sharply for 20-year property, the qualified capital 
with the lowest tax depreciation rate and therefore the highest benefit from the bonus.  
Since the tax subsidy decreases as the tax depreciation rate increases, investment in 
qualified capital declines steadily as a function of tax depreciation rates.  The lower 
panels graph the changes in real shadow prices against the tax depreciation rates.  The 
response is the same as for quantity except for scaling by the elasticity of supply.    
 
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BONUS DEPRECIATION 
We use data on real investment spending and real investment prices to estimate the 
parameters of equations (22) and (23).  The estimates yield a value for the elasticity of 
supply (ξ ) and allow us to test whether investment prices reflect the tax subsidy.   
 
5.1 Data 
We use data from the BEA to construct a quarterly panel of investment quantities and 
prices by type.  We match the BEA investment data to IRS depreciation schedules.  Once 
we exclude BEA types that do not have clear matches to the IRS depreciation schedules,   18
our panel has 36 types of capital with quarterly observations from 1959 to 2005.
10  We 
construct real investment purchases by dividing nominal purchases of type m capital by 
the price index for that type.  The relative price for type m capital is defined as the m
th 
price index divided by the GDP deflator.  (The appendix provides more information on 
this data.  See Appendix Table 2 for a list of the capital goods in our data set.)   
For our econometric procedure we also use aggregate data on GDP and corporate 
profits and data on type-specific investment tax credits.
11  Finally, equations (22) and 
(23) require the cyclical component of aggregate consumption  t C  .  For this series, we use 
HP-filtered real consumption of nondurables and services with a quarterly smoothing 
parameter of 1600.   
 
5.2 Econometric Specification and Estimation 
Equations (22) and (23) show how investment quantities and prices respond to bonus 
depreciation.  Before turning our attention to these structural equations, we first need to 
estimate what investment and prices would have been in the absence of the policy.  We 
use several decades of data prior to the policy to forecast investment quantities and prices 
for each type of capital.  The resulting forecast errors serve as data for the structural 
equations (22) and (23).   
The forecasting equations we use to project investment quantity and price are 
reduced forms.  Our theory does not mandate what variables to include.  Our aim is 
simply to control for major determinants of investment quantities and prices unrelated to 
the policy we are studying.  We construct forecasts for horizons h = 1 … H using 
forecasting equations of the form 
  ( )
,,
, ln
mh m m h m
th I t I t IB Z ε + =+  (24) 
and 
  ( )
,,
, ln
mh m m h m
th p t p t pB Z ε + =+ . (25) 
                                                 
10 The BEA made changes to its series on private domestic investment in 1997.  We therefore use 
investment categories that were consistent before and after 1997.  We exclude steam engines from the 
analysis because it is a consistent outlier.  The point estimates we report are similar with or without steam 
engines. 
11 We are grateful to Dale Jorgenson for providing us with the data on the ITC by capital type.  These data 
are constructed using methods detailed in Jorgenson and Yun [1991].     19
m
th I +  and 
m
th p +  are the investment quantity and price for horizon h and type m capital. The 
vector 
m
t Z  includes the variables we use to construct the forecasts.  
, hm
I B  and 
, hm
p B  are the 
corresponding parameters.  Since (24) and (25) are simply auxiliary forecasting 
equations, we are fairly agnostic about their specification.  Our baseline specification for 
the forecast equations includes the t and t −1 values of the following variables: 
investment quantity and prices, the log of aggregate real GDP, the corporate profit rate, 
and the type-specific Investment Tax Credit.  It also includes a constant and a time-trend.  
As a parsimonious alternative, we also consider forecasting equations with only the 
constant and time trend in 
m
t Z .   
We estimate (24) and (25) over the sample period t = 1,...,T = 1965:1 to 2000:4.
12  
We then use these equations to project investment quantities and prices over 2001:1 to 
2005:4.  Because our forecasts for this period all condition on the same information (i.e., 




I ε  for investment and 
, ˆ
hm
p ε  for prices.  Each h = 1,…,H corresponds to a 
quarter between 2001:1 and 2005:4 (h = 1 is 2001:1).   
We now estimate (22) and (23) with the forecast errors as the left-hand-side 
variables.  Define  1
m Ψ  and  2




























These parameters are constant across time, but differ across types of capital m. 
Calculating  1
m Ψ  and  2
m Ψ  requires values for 
π τ , 
d τ  and 
m z  which are observable.  
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=+Ψ + Ψ +   (26) 
where  0 I β , ξ , and  / ξσ are parameters to be estimated, and 
, hm
I e is an error unrelated to 
the change in the policy.  The bonus rate 
m
h λ  is 0.3 or 0.5 for eligible capital during 
                                                 
12 For computer equipment, the estimation period begins in 1970:1.    20
2002:2 to 2004:1 and zero otherwise (i.e.,  0
m
h λ =  for ineligible capital and for all capital 
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pp p h h p Ce εβ β λ
σ
=+ Ψ + Ψ +  . (27) 
If investment adjustment costs were entirely external (and thus included in measured 
prices) then the estimate of  1 p β  should be one.  Since adjustment costs may be partially 
internal, any value of  1 p β  between zero and one is consistent with the theory.   
At a fundamental level, variation in tax policy across types and across time 
identifies the structural parameters in the model.  Investment also influenced by 
aggregate conditions.  Equations (26) and (27) show that the response to aggregate 
conditions varies systematically across the type of capital.  According to the model, the 
appropriate control variable is marginal utility times  2
m Ψ .  To control for aggregate 
conditions, we consider two measures of marginal utility.  First, we use a specification 
based on our model.  In the model, marginal utility is proportional to  h C   (HP-filtered 
consumption of nondurables and services).  Thus our first specification includes  2
m
h C Ψ   as 
a control variable.  Our second method allows for the possibility that marginal utility is 
poorly-proxied by filtered consumption.  We replace the consumption-based measure of 
marginal utility with time-dummies scaled by the same type-specific factors.    That is, in 





− Ψ   is replaced by   2, 1
H m
kh k k d β
= Ψ ∑  
where  k β  are parameters that subsume 
1
k C ξσ
−   and   , 1 hk d =  if h = k and zero otherwise 
(i.e.,  , hk d  are time-dummy variables) .  We make a similar substitution for equation (27).  
These estimates treat the marginal utility of consumption as an unobserved time-varying 
object that is common across investment types.  Obviously using time-dummies, the 
parameter σ  is not identified.  
The disturbances 
, hm
I e  and 
, hm
p e  are not independently and identically distributed.  
Let  i Ω  and  p Ω  be the HM HM × covariance matrices for the disturbances 
, hm
I e  and 
, hm
p e .  
There are three important features of these covariance matrices.  First, within type, the 
forecast errors are likely correlated across time.  Second, there is substantial   21
heteroskedacity across types because some types are less predictable than others.  Finally, 
there is correlation across types because certain investment goods react to common 
shocks in systematic way.   
Clearly, with 36 types (M  = 36) and 20 periods, (H = 20), we cannot estimate the 
parameters of these matrices as each has more than 270,000 independent parameters.  
Instead, we impose some additional structure on  I Ω  and  p Ω .  To pool the types across 
time, we assume the covariance matrices have the following structure  
    and   III ppp RR Ω = ⊗Σ Ω = ⊗Σ . (28) 
I R  and  p R  are HH × matrixes giving the correlation of the disturbances across time 
within a type.   I Σ  and  p Σ  are M M × matrices giving the covariance across types for a 
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hH s  are the sample covariances of the residuals from equations (24) and 
(25) respectively.  Similarly,  I Σ  and  p Σ  are the sample covariance matrices of the 
residuals of (24) and (25) for horizon h = 1.  These calculations provide consistent 
estimates of  I Ω  and  p Ω  that we use to provide correct standard errors for our structural 
parameter estimates.   
We do not use the full covariance structure to estimate the structural parameters, 
so our parameter estimates are robust to misspecification of  I Ω  and  p Ω .  We estimate 
(26) and (27) by ordinary least squares (OLS) and also by weighted least squares (WLS) 
using the inverses of the diagonals of  I Ω  and  p Ω  as weighting matrices.  The WLS 
estimates improve the efficiency of the estimates in light of the strong heteroskedacity in 
the forecast errors across types.
13 
 
                                                 
13 See Appendix A.5 for more details on our estimation procedure.  Our specification differs from the 
standard two-step procedure because we estimate the covariance matrix over a large sample (1965-2000) 
and then use them to adjust our structural estimates in a separate, subsequent data set (i.e., 2001-2004).  
Similarly, there is nothing to be gained from estimating the forecasting equations (24) and (25) jointly with 
the structural equations (26) and (27).     22
5.3 Results 
5.3.1  Scatterplots 
Before turning to the structural estimates of (26) and (27), it is instructive to plot the data.  
Figure 3 shows the log forecast errors from the baseline forecast specification. Each panel 
represents a time period. The tax depreciation rates are on the horizontal axes. The panels 
on the top row show the forecast errors for real investment while the lower panels show 
the forecast errors for real relative prices.  These plots correspond to the theoretical plots 
shown in Figure 2.  Each point in the figure is the forecast error for a single quarter and a 
single type of capital.  Since each panel includes multiple quarters, there are several 
observations per type.  Solid points are types that qualify for bonus depreciation.  Empty 
circles are types that do not qualify.  We group the data into five time periods.  The first 
period, 2001:1 to 2001:3, was before the policy was discussed or in effect.  The second 
period, 2001:4 to 2002:1, was before the policy was law but during which the policy 
applied retroactively.  We refer to the second period as the anticipation period.  The third 
and fourth periods, 2002:2 to 2003:2, and 2003:3 to 2004:1 correspond to the periods of 
the 30 and 50 percent bonus.  The last period, 2005:1 to 2005:4 is after the policy 
expired.   
  Consider that data for investment quantity shown in the top row of Figure 3.  As 
one would expect, in the first period (before the policy), there is no discernable 
relationship between the tax depreciation rate and investment forecast errors.  In the 
anticipation period, the pattern predicted by the theory is clearly evident.  There is a sharp 
discontinuity between eligible property and ineligible property and there is a negative 
relationship between the tax depreciation rate and investment among qualified properties.   
This pattern remains in the third and fourth panels.  In the fifth panel, after the expiration 
of the policy, the data do not clearly return to normal.  The negative relationship among 
qualified types is not clear, but the discontinuity between unqualified types and qualified 
types with low tax depreciation rates persists into 2005.  
Overall, comparing the actual forecast errors for real investment in Figure 3 with 
the simulated data in Figure 2 suggests that the tax policy had the predicted effects.  In 
Section 5.4 we discuss the expiration of the policy in 2005.     23
The bottom row of Figure 3 shows the same plots for the price data.  Unlike the 
quantity data, there is no discernable pattern of price movements across types of capital 
or across time periods.  The variability in the forecast errors suggests that it is not going 
to be possible to test the theory using these data.  We will confirm this below in the 
econometric analysis.   
 
5.3.2 Structural estimates of elasticity of supply 
We now turn to the structural estimates of equations (26) and (27).  We fit these 
equations with the data plotted in Figure 3.  The left-hand side variables are the forecast 
errors and the explanatory variables are as defined in the equations.  For these estimates, 
the timing of the policy corresponds to the signing dates and the expiration date provided 
by the law.  Thus the 30 percent bonus goes into effect in 2002:2, the 50 percent bonus 
goes into effect in 2003:3 and the policy expires in 2005:1.   
Table 4 shows the estimates of the structural parameters.  Panel A gives the 
estimates of the investment equation (26).  The rows give alternative macroeconomic 
controls in the forecasting and structural equations.  In row 1 of Panel A, the baseline 
forecast specification, the WLS estimate of ξ  is 11.64 with an adjusted standard error of 
2.55.  The OLS point estimate is similar, but with a somewhat larger standard error.  (The 
comparison of OLS and WLS is similar for all specifications, so we discuss only the 
more efficient WLS estimates.)  As expected, the standard errors in the specification with 
only a time trend (rows 2 and 4) are larger because the forecasts are less precise.
14  Lines 
3 and 4 of Panel A, give the estimates for the specification where the scaled time-
dummies replace the consumption-based measure of marginal utility as the control for the 
aggregate effects of the policy.  The point estimates for ξ  are uniformly higher—21.84 in 
the baseline forecast specification.   
The econometric estimates quantify what was evident from Figure 3.  There is a 
powerful response of the quantity of investment to the bonus for types of capital that 
                                                 
14 We experimented with several alternative specifications of the forecasting equations.  The results were 
not sensitive to these alternatives.  Among the alternatives was a specification including contemporaneous 
GDP and profits in (24) and (25) to control for systematic cyclical responses of investment.  The resulting 
change in our point estimates was negligible.     24
benefited substantially from the bonus.  The strong movements in quantity yield high 
estimates of the elasticity of supply—ranging between 11 and 21. 
 
5.3.3. Structural estimates of implied bonus rate 
In the estimation presented in Table 4, 
m
h λ  is a known parameter of the tax policy—equal 
to 0.3 or 0.5 for eligible capital during the period of the bonus and zero otherwise.  The 
exact timing of the bonus in these estimates is assumed to match with the enactment in 
law, that is, zero prior to 2002:2 and after 2004:4.  Alternatively, we can estimate the 
time series of implied the bonus rates that best fits the cross-section of investment period-
by-period.  To do so, we relax the constancy of the response to the bonus across time 
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Here  k Λ  is the implied bonus rate for period k and  , hk d  is again a time-dummy equal to 
one when h = k and zero otherwise.  
m B  equals one for types eligible for the bonus and 
zero otherwise.  Since the implied bonus and the elasticity of supply cannot be identified 
separately, in equation (30) we set ξ  at a fixed value of 21, roughly the upper bound on 
the estimates in Table 4.  Figure 4 plots the estimates of  h Λ , the implied bonus rate. The 
dotted lines are one-standard-error bands.  The thin solid line is the time path of the 
statutory bonus depreciation rate (dashed during the retroactive/anticipation period).  As 
in Table 4, we consider specifications with either aggregate consumption (top panel) or 
scaled time-dummies (bottom panel) to control for aggregate effects.   
The implied bonus rate in the upper panel of Figure 4 closely tracks the actual 
bonus rate.  The estimates are close to zero in early 2001, but then jump in mid- to late-
2001.  This finding is consistent with a credible anticipation of the enactment of the 
retroactive policy.  The implied bonus tapers off throughout 2003 and 2004.  Empirically, 
this means that the differential increase in investment in types of goods benefiting most 
from the bonus is diminishing.  By 2005, when the bonus has expired, the implied bonus 
is approaching zero.   25
The diminishing effect of the policy in the upper panel of Figure 4 is not clearly 
evident in the scatterplots in Figure 3.  Indeed, when we re-estimate (30) using  2
m Ψ -
scaled time-dummies instead of  2
m
t C Ψ  , the effects of the policy seem to persist even 
throughout 2005.  The lower panel of Figure 4 plots the implied bonus rate for this 
specification.  Looking back to Figure 3, it is clear that the evidence for 2005 is mixed.  It 
is therefore not surprising that our estimates also yield mixed results on this point. 
 
5.3.4  Structural estimates of response of price of investment 
We now turn briefly to the structural estimates for the response of observed investment 
prices to bonus depreciation.  It is clear from the scatterplots in Figure 3 that the sharp 
pattern exhibited by the quantities is not present in the price data.  Table 4, Panel B, 
reports the structural estimates of equation (27).  The theory implies that the shadow 
price of capital should change one-for-one with the tax subsidy.  If all adjustment costs 
were external, and thus reflected in the purchase price, then  1 p β  in equation (27) should 
be one.  If a fraction θ  of adjustment costs are internal, then  1 p β should reflect this 
fraction.  In the table, the point estimates of  1 p β  are negative, and have large standard 
errors.  The standard errors are so large that we can reject neither 1 (pure external 
adjustment costs) nor 0 (pure internal adjustment costs).  Time-varying estimates for the 
price data analogous to Figure 4 (not reported) similarly show uniformly negative point 
estimates with wide confidence intervals. 
It is not too surprising that we cannot detect the effect of the policy in the price 
data.  Even if adjustment costs were completely external, price changes of this magnitude 
would be difficult to detect. The calculations in Table 3, Panel B indicated that the value 
of the subsidy was at most 5 to 8 percent.  Thus we should expect prices to rise by no 
more than 8 percent for the most heavily subsidized goods.  Such price changes are small 
relative to the standard deviation of forecast errors for prices (roughly 10 to 20 percent 
during the period 2002:2 to 2004:4).  Thus, while price data can, in theory, provide a 
good test of the model, in practice, the price data is simply too noisy to permit such an 
assessment.  In contrast, the quantity of investment of eligible types responds by many   26




Our research design uses two exogenous dimensions of variation in the data—the 
differential value of the bonus depreciation allowance across type and the time-series 
variation of the policy.  While the cross-sectional investment data strongly supports basic 
predictions of the model, the evidence from the timing of the changes, though generally 
supportive of the theory, is not as sharp.  Indeed, the data indicate that investment reacted 
prior to the signing of the bill and that the expiration of the policy was not clear in the 
data.  We deal with the anticipation and expiration of the policy in turn.   
Our scatterplots and econometric analysis clearly show that the effects of bonus 
depreciation were evident prior to its enactment.  While the bill was not signed until 
March 2002, there were clear signals in the preceding months that such legislation would 
be passed.  The Economic Security and Recovery Act of 2001 was passed by the House 
on October 24 and included the depreciation provisions.
15  It is standard to make changes 
in tax provisions retroactive because it is well-understood that failing to do so creates 
incentives to delay economic activity.  Usually, provisions are retroactive to date of a law 
is introduced but in this case, the Congress chose the symbolic date of September 11, 
2001.  The continuing slow recovery of the economy from the 2001 recession made the 
eventual passage of the legislation relatively certain.
16  Hence, it seems reasonable that 
the apparent anticipation of the policy in 2001:4 and 2002:1 in our results are genuine 
responses of firms to the policy rather than a fluke of the data. 
The expiration of bonus depreciation occurred on schedule at the end of 2004.  
While our structural estimates depend critically on the public’s belief that the policies 
would expire, as long as there was some probability that the policy would expire, firms 
                                                 
15 The depreciation provisions were the first items in the bill (see Joint Tax Committee, October 11, 2001).  
These provisions—including the retroactivity to September 11, 2001—survived intact from the Ways and 
Means Committee’s markup on October 12, 2001 to the bill as finally enacted.   
16 “While it has gotten little attention, the so-called bonus depreciation is the one corporate tax break sure to 
become law.”  Boston Globe (December 7, 2001) p. E1.   27
still had a powerful incentive to invest prior to 2005.
17  Our evidence on the expiration is 
mixed.  Neither the scatterplots in Figure 3 nor the time varying implied bonus rate in 
Figure 4 provide clear evidence of the expiration.  Moreover, in the top panel of Figure 4, 
the implied bonus peaked well before the expiration of the policy.  Several important 
factors likely contribute to the lack of sharp evidence for the expiration of the policy.  
First, many of the investment projects benefiting most from bonus depreciation—radio 
towers, farm buildings, electricity distribution systems, telephone communication 
systems, etc.—likely require substantial time-to-build and may have long lead times.  In 
recognition of the time-to-build of complex pieces of equipment, the original tax bill 
permitted certain property to claim bonus depreciation as late as January 1, 2006.
18   
Second, projects that did not qualify for this extension needed to be installed by 
the end of 2004 to receive the bonus.  Thus many firms had an incentive to frontload the 
projects to avoid missing the deadline.  Many investment projects requiring more than 
one year lead time were effectively not subsidized in 2004.   
Third, the increased small-business exemptions under Section 179 undoubtedly 
influence our results.  The increased 179 exemption shares many of the features of bonus 
depreciation.  The 179 exemption is equivalent to a 100 percent bonus depreciation on 
qualified investment up to the maximum deduction under 179.
19  Prior to 2002, 
businesses could expense $24,000 of investment per year.  The 2002 bill raised this 
ceiling temporarily to $25,000.  This exemption, like bonus depreciation, was set to 
expire at the end of 2004. The 2003 bill increased the ceiling further to $100,000 and 
extended the expiration data to the end of 2005.
20  Thus, in our data, the average effective 
bonus rate exceeds the statutory rates of 30 or 50 percent that we assume in our structural 
                                                 
17 A National Association of Business Economics (NABE) survey in January 2004 found that 62 percent of 
business economists expected the policy to be extended.   
18 To qualify for the extended expiration date, the property had to have a recovery period of at least 10 
years, and either have a production period of at least two years or cost more than $1 million, and have a 
production period of at least one year.  
19 Firms above the cutoff faced the 30 or 50 percent bonus rate.  However, like many features of the U.S. 
tax code, the 179 exemption has a phase-out range above its exemption cutoff.  Thus, firms that are just 
above the cutoff faced effective bonus rates between 100 and 30 or 50 percent.   
20 The 2004 Working Families Tax Relief Act, approved by Congress in September 2004, extend the 
$100,000 Section 179 ceiling to the end of 2007.  It also extended several provisions that were scheduled to 
sunset.  The bonus depreciation allowance was not among the extensions.  The extended provisions include 
the child tax credit, the 10 percent tax bracket, marriage penalty relief and AMT relief, all of which were 
set to expire under pre-existing law.   28
estimation.  Moreover, because 179 was set to expire later, to the extent that it stimulates 
investment, it will obscure the expiration of the 50 percent bonus at the end of 2004.  
In summary, the pattern of changes our theory predicts is clearly evident in the 
cross-sectional investment data.  Likewise, our econometric model yields a high estimate 
for the elasticity of supply.  On the other hand, complications in the timing of the 
expiration of the policy, the confounding differential expiration of the Section 179 
expensing, and time-to-build of large projects make the time-series evidence less sharp. 
 
5.5. Related Empirical Literature 
We do not attempt to summarize the huge literature that uses tax changes to estimate 
investment models.  Instead, we focus on a few papers that are closely related to our 
work.   
Goolsbee [1998] presents evidence that increases in the Investment Tax Credit 
bids up prices without sharp increases in real investment.  This finding contrasts with our 
results which show that investment spending reacted strongly to bonus depreciation, but 
do not show a clear price reaction.  Although we do not know exactly what is responsible 
for the discrepancy, two important differences in the policies Goolsbee examines and the 
bonus depreciation analyzed here could play a role.  First, bonus depreciation was 
explicitly temporary, while the ITC (the focus of Goolsbee’s paper) was more persistent.  
On the one hand this suggests that investment spending should respond more but, on the 
other hand, it also means that prices should respond more.  Second, while the ITC applied 
evenly to a broad class of equipment, bonus depreciation was concentrated on a narrow 
portion of total investment.  Because the tax policy gave strong tax incentives to certain 
“quasi-structures” but not to business structures in general, there was substantial room for 
substitution across these industries.  For example, bonus depreciation provides a 
substantial subsidy to farm structures.  It is natural to think that firms that build other 
structures (that were not subsidized) could easily switch temporarily to construct farm 
structures while the policy was in effect.
21   
                                                 
21 It is possible that price data imperfectly reflect high frequency variation that would arise from temporary 
tax changes.  If so, this measurement problem could be another source of the difference between our results 
and Goolsbee’s, which were based on more persistent tax changes.  Nevertheless, the predicted movements   29
Based on a difference-in-difference specification, Cohen and Cummins [2006] in 
a paper written after the first draft of this paper was circulated, conclude that bonus 
depreciation was largely ineffective.  Some of the details of their analysis lead it to have 
little power to detect the effects of the bonus.  First, they aggregate investment into two 
groups: five-year capital or less, and seven-year capital or more.  The two groups 
function as a treatment group and a control group.  Because of the relative abundance of 
five and seven-year capital in total investment, this aggregation implies that Cohen and 
Cummins are effectively comparing five-year and seven-year capital, neither of which 
gets much benefit from bonus depreciation (see Table 3, Panel B).  Second, they date the 
onset of the policy in 2003:2 and assume that the expiration is in 2005:1.  Our results 
show, however, that the policy was anticipated perhaps as early as 2001:4 and the 
expiration, for reasons discussed above, was not a sharp cutoff.    
Knittel [2005a, 2005b] presents evidence based on IRS tax returns that many 
businesses—particularly small businesses—claimed neither bonus depreciation nor the 
179 exemption to the fullest extent even though they had qualified investments.  
Although Knittel’s finding presents a puzzle from the standpoint of basic economics, it 
does not invalidate the central arbitrage argument underlying our analysis.  Suppose 
investment decisions were made by two groups of individuals: rational firms that react 
the way theory dictates, and irrational firms whose spending is exogenous and thus 
unresponsive to policy (perhaps because they do not understand the tax code and thus 
frequently file in a manner that is not to their advantage).  This modification would 
change neither our main theoretical results nor our econometric approach nor the 
aggregate effects of the policy.  In equilibrium, the rational investors are indifferent as to 
when they invest.  Indeed, this near indifference is the heart of our empirical and 
theoretical results.  Even if they are in the minority, because they effectively arbitrage 
predictable movements in the after-tax price, the behavior of the rational agents will 
cause the after-tax price to stay at its steady state level.  As before, price fully reflects the 
subsidy and investment is determined by the supply curve.   
                                                                                                                                                 
in quantities are so large relative to those of prices (see Figure 3) that our test should still reveal the effects 
of the policy in quantity data even if the price data used to construct them do not.     30
Finally, our estimates of the elasticity of investment supply are related to the 
literature on the estimation of investment adjustment costs.  Early estimates, based on 
Brainard-Tobin’s Q suggested implausibly high adjustment costs (see Hayashi [1982], 
Summers [1981], and Tobin [1981]).  Estimates based on the firm’s first-order condition 
typically lead to low to moderate adjustment costs (see Shapiro [1984] and Hall [2004]).  
Similarly, more recent estimates based on the Q theory that take into account timing, 
gestation lags, and measurement errors lead to more moderate adjustment costs (see 
Erickson and Whited [2000] and Millar [2005]). Our estimates of an elasticity of 
investment supply between 10 and 20 correspond to adjustment cost elasticities in the Q 
framework of between 1 and 2.
22  Hence, as with the more recent estimates, we find that 
adjustment costs are quite low. 
 
VI. AGGREGATE EFFECTS OF THE 2002 AND 2003 TAX LAWS 
We now consider the possible aggregate effects of the tax laws.  To do so, we use the 
estimates from Section V to calibrate the general equilibrium model and then we simulate 
the aggregate effects of the tax policy.   
 
6.1 Calibration 
We calibrate the model to match broad features of the U.S. economy and to match our 
estimates from the previous section.  Our estimates of the elasticity of investment supply 
fall between 11 and 21.  For our baseline calibration we take a value that is roughly in the 
midpoint of this range and set ξ  equal to 15.  The remaining parameters are set as 
follows.  The annual discount factor (β ) is 0.97, which gives a 3 percent annual real 
interest rate.  The annual rate of inflation (π ) is 3 percent.  The Frisch labor supply 
elasticity (η) is 0.5 which is in line with recent estimates (see Farber [2003] and Kimball 
and Shapiro [2003]).  We set σ , the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, to 0.2, which 
is roughly the average estimate in Hall [1988], Campbell and Mankiw [1989] and Barsky, 
et al. [1997].  To calibrate labor’s share, we take the average value of total employee 
                                                 
22 Recall that ξ=(γ δ )
−1 where γ  is the elasticity of adjustment costs in Hayashi’s formulation (see 
footnote 1).  For an average depreciation rate of 5 percent, ξ  of 10 or 20 corresponds respectively to γ  of  
2 or 1.     31
compensation as a fraction of total GDP less proprietors’ income over the post war 
period.  This gives 10 . 6 2 α − = .  We set the share of government purchases in steady 
state to 0.2 which is roughly the average over 1990 to 2005.  We calibrate the capital tax 
rates (  and 
d π ττ ) to match the average marginal tax rates across income sources as 
detailed in the appendix.  This gives  0.22
π τ =  and  0.30
d τ = .  These calibrations 
account for differences in forms of ownership and for differences in financial structure.  
The baseline parameter values are summarized in Table 5. (The calibration of the labor 
tax rate 
N τ , which is constant, has no influence on our results.)   
We allow for ten different types of capital.  Having this many types of capital 
allows us to capture the heterogeneity in depreciation schedules in the U.S. tax code.  The 
economic rates of depreciation for each type of capital are based primarily on Fraumeni 
[1997].
23  The approximate MACRS depreciation rates ( ˆm δ ) are defined to be broadly 
consistent with IRS publication 946 and with Brazell and Mackie [2000].  The capital 
share parameters ( m γ ) are set to match the relative investment shares from the U.S. 
National Income and Product Accounts.  Investment shares are not constant over the 
post-war period.  Since the policies we analyze are current, we choose  m γ  to match the 
model’s investment shares with their empirical averages from 1990-2002.  Table 6 lists 
the capital types included in the model together with their economic and tax depreciation 
rates and shares of total investment.  See the appendix for more details on our calibration. 
In the simulations, the timing of the bonus depreciation allowance follows the 
timing of the enactment of the legislation and that all of the policy changes are 
unanticipated.  A simulation with anticipations of the policy during the retroactive period 
would have similar aggregate effects, but with an onset two quarters earlier.  The 
simulation also has a sharp cutoff at the expiration of the bonus.  Adding time-to-build 
would move the effects of the bonus earlier. 
 
6.2 The 2002 and 2003 Tax Laws: Baseline Simulation 
Figure 5 shows the simulated reaction to the bonus depreciation allowances.  The top two 
panels show the responses of GDP, total employment, aggregate investment and 
                                                 
23 These rates are estimated using techniques established by Hulten and Wykoff [1981a, 1981b].   32
aggregate consumption.  The lower panels show the response of investment for each type 
of capital.   
Employment, output, and investment increase after each policy change.  The 
biggest effects come after the 2003 law.  In the quarter after JGTRRA passes, GDP is 0.18 
percent above trend.  Employment and aggregate investment are 0.19 and 1.80 percent 
above trend.  Consumption decreases by 0.06 percent relative to trend.  To put these 
figures in perspective, based on actual GDP in 2003 ($11 trillion) and total employment 
in 2003 (130 million workers), bonus depreciation increased GDP by roughly $17.4 
billion and increased employment by roughly 191 thousand jobs (assuming the increase 
in employment is entirely at the extensive margin).   
The modest effects of the policies are due to the fact that many types of 
investment goods are not substantially affected.  Housing, and (most) business structures 
fail to qualify for bonus depreciation.  Furthermore, most qualified investment is not 
substantially affected by the policy.  Five-year property, vehicles and computer 
equipment for instance, get only small subsidies.  For the U.S., the investments that are 
significantly affected account for at most 9 percent of total investment. 
The simulated effects of the policy are more striking when one compares 
investment across types of capital (the bottom panels of the figure).  At one extreme are 
farming structures,
24 rail structures, and electric power structures which increase by 
almost 40.0 percent after JGTRRA.  Telephone structures and other power and utility 
structures increase by 30 percent.  At the other extreme, residential investment and 
commercial structures both contract by roughly 6 percent.  
Note that aggregate investment does not fall below steady state when the policy 
expires.  First, there is an increase in investment in structures.  (Industrial and residential 
structures have essentially the same path, so only the line for residential structures shows 
in the Figure 5.)  During the period of the bonus, investment in capital that did not 
receive the bonus is depressed by the aggregate scarcity of resources.  Second, though 
investment in qualified types falls below steady state, the reductions following the 
expiration of the bonus are smaller that the high rates of investment during 2002:2 to 
2004:4.  There are two reasons for the lack of an investment slump following the 
                                                 
24 This category does not include single purpose agricultural structures.    33
expiration.  First, while it is true that once the subsidy expires the stock of qualified 
capital is above steady state, the stock is not far above steady state.  The capital goods 
that were affected most had very low depreciation rates and thus the stock is a slow 
moving variable even when investment is abnormally high.  Second, to bring these 
capital stocks back to steady state, there is a gradual reduction in investment spread out 
over many periods in the future rather than a sharp reversal in investment rates.   
 
6.3 The 2002 and 2003 Tax Laws: Alternative Parameter Values  
Table 7 considers several alternatives to our baseline calibration.  For each specification 
we document the change in GDP and total employment in 2003 predicted by the model.  
The different specifications are described in the table.  Parameters not explicitly stated in 
the table are set at their baseline values.   
As we decrease the elasticity of investment supply the aggregate effects decrease 
moderately.  Reducing ξ  to 10 implies that GDP in 2003 increases by 0.145 percent and 
employment in 2003 increases by 183 thousand jobs.  Similarly, a higher elasticity 
magnifies the changes in GDP and employment modestly.  As discussed above, our 
estimates are high relative to the literature on internal investment adjustment costs.  In 
this case the increase in 2003 GDP is only 0.098 percent and the increase in employment 
is 132 thousand jobs.   
Changing the tax structure of the model has strong effects on the outcome.  For 
instance, the 2003 tax law also reduced dividend and capital gains taxes to 15 percent for 
most individuals.  If we set  0.15
d τ =  rather than 0.30 then the increase in GDP in 2003 
is 0.207 percent and roughly 268 thousand jobs are created.  Naturally, more elastic labor 
supply causes the economy to expand more.  A higher intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution for consumption ( 1 σ = ) implies that households are more willing to reduce 
consumption to finance investment.  Thus, employment and production react less when 
σ  is higher.  Variations in the nominal interest rate change the value of the bonus 
depreciation allowance.  When nominal interest rates are only 4 percent for instance, the 
increase in GDP is only 0.114 percent in 2003.     34
The effects of the policy are modest across all of these specifications.  For the 
most part, the predicted increase in 2003 GDP lies between 0.10 and 0.20 percent of GDP 
and employment increases by roughly 100,000 to 200,000 jobs.   
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Because the value of long-lived capital is dictated by long-run considerations, it is not 
sensitive to changes in the timing of purchase or installation.  As a result, there are strong 
incentives to alter the timing of investment in response to temporary tax subsidies.  These 
incentives are so strong that for a sufficiently temporary tax change, or a sufficiently 
long-lived capital good, the shadow price of new investment changes to fully reflect the 
tax subsidy regardless of the elasticity of investment supply.  Observing that prices of 
such capital goods rise following explicitly temporary tax incentives does not imply that 
the supply of such goods is inelastic.  Instead, the elasticity of supply can be inferred 
from quantity data alone.  While prices do not reveal the elasticity of supply, price data 
can reveal the composition of internal versus external adjustment costs.  If prices only 
partially reflect the subsidy then a significant fraction of the cost of investment is internal 
to the firm.   
  The high elasticity of intertemporal substitution implies a structural relationship 
between investment and changes in the cost of capital goods that holds under very 
general conditions.  Because the relationship depends only on an arbitrage argument, 
unlike approaches based on Q-theory, we do not require strong assumptions on the form 
of the production function, returns to scale, or homogeneity of the adjustment cost 
function.  Instead, our results simply require an upward sloping investment supply 
function and sufficiently temporary tax subsidies.  The implied relationship also shows 
precisely how to control for changes in the aggregate scarcity of resources and therefore 
takes into account general equilibrium effects of the policy.  For policy changes that have 
broad effects, the general equilibrium channel can substantially attenuate the impact of 
the policy on investment even with a high elasticity of supply (low adjustment costs).   
The general results hold for only the specific circumstance of a sufficiently 
temporary change in the cost of purchasing capital goods.  Calculations show that for 
long-lived durable capital goods, even changes in tax policy that last for several years can   35
safely be modeled as temporary.  Given the frequency of changes in tax policy, our 
analysis can be applied to many episodes. 
The bonus depreciation allowance passed in 2002 and then increased in 2003 
provides an opportunity to estimate the effective elasticity of investment supply and to 
test the theory.  Only investment goods with a tax recovery period less than or equal to 20 
years qualify for the bonus depreciation.  The theory suggests that there should be a sharp 
difference in the response of investment spending between the 20-year investment goods 
and those with more than a 20-year recovery period.  In addition, among the qualified 
investment goods, we should observe higher investment spending for goods with higher 
tax recovery periods.  The data support both predictions.  Bonus depreciation appears to 
have had a powerful effect on the composition of investment.  Capital that benefited 
substantially from the policy, namely equipment with long tax lives, saw sharp increases 
in investment.  In contrast, there is no evidence that market prices increased due to the 
policy.   
Although the policy expired in 2005, it is not clear whether investment spending 
returned to normal as one would predict.  This is likely due to the extension of bonus 
depreciation for certain properties and the increased Section 179 exemption (a tax 
incentive that shares many of the features of bonus depreciation).   
Because the data indicate that qualified investment goods responded strongly to 
the tax policy, the estimated investment supply elasticities are quite high—roughly 
between 10 and 20.  We use our estimates to assess the likely aggregate impacts of the 
policy.  Because the policy was narrowly focused on a small subset of investment 
spending, we find that it had only modest effects on aggregate employment and output 
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APPENDICES 
 
A.1. The Steady State 
The model has a non-stochastic steady state equilibrium associated with constant tax rates 
and a constant rate of government spending.  Here we briefly outline how this steady 
state is calculated.   
In steady state  ,  
mm m m m
t KK I K m δ == ∀ .  As a matter of convenience, we 
assume that the average cost of investment (like the marginal cost of investment) is 1 in 
steady state.  This requires placing assumptions on the production functions which 
generate the supply functions  ( )
mm
t I ϕ .
25  Thus  1
m






− = − .  We calculate the steady state subsidy 
m ζ  according to equation 
(21) in the text with no bonus depreciation rate.  The approximate tax depreciation rates 
ˆm δ  are the ratio of the declining balance rate for the type of capital in question divided by 
the recovery period (e.g., for automobiles, the declining balance rate is 200 percent, and 
the recovery period is 5 years so ˆm δ  is 40 percent). 
The real and nominal interest rates are 
1 1 r β
− +=  and  () () 11 1 ir π += + + .  The 
Euler equations (7) give the real rental prices for each type of capital 


















m R , we can express the steady state capital stocks 
m K  in terms of one reference 
capital stock.  We take m = 1 as the reference capital stock.  Then, (10) implies that that 






























≡ .  Together with the production function (9), total output is  
  () ()
1 1 YA K N
α α α −
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= Ξ=∏ .  Equation (10) pins down the equilibrium capital to labor ratios 
and, with equation (11), the output to labor ratio.  The pre-tax real wage is then, 
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where ξ > 0.  This function can be inverted to get the production function  ()
mm
t I Φ .  Note that this 
formulation includes a flow fixed cost of production which is necessary to allow for an increasing marginal 
cost but for equal marginal and average costs in the steady state.  We assume that there are many firms 
(measure 1) that produce investment goods each with the same cost/production function.  The firms behave 
competitively but there is no entry.     40
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A.2. Notes on Calibration 
We set  m γ  to match the relative steady state levels of investment with the corresponding 
investment rates in the data.  We begin with the real rental prices 
m R  and compare type 1 



































⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∑ . 
We use NIPA data to calibrate the investment ratios 
1 /
m I I ; we use depreciation figures 
from Fraumeni [1997] to calibrate the depreciation ratios 
1 /
m δδ .  
To calibrate 
π τ  and 
d τ , we assume that, for all types of capital (other than 
residential capital), payments, depreciation, transfers, and indirect business taxes are split 
between proprietorships and corporations.  The fraction of the corporate sector is 
calibrated from NIPA data by taking the sum of corporate profits and net interest and 
dividing by the sum of corporate profits, net interest and proprietors’ capital income as 
defined in Section 5.3.  For 1990-2002, the ratio of corporate capital income to total 
capital income is F
corp = 0.85.  Proprietors deduct depreciation directly from their 
personal income.  We assume that marginal tax rates for proprietors are 0.30, which is 
roughly the average tax rate for upper income individuals.  This income is only taxed 
once so, for proprietorships,  0.30 and  0
d π ττ == .   
We treat the corporate sector as financed partially with debt and partially with 
equity.  We calculate the share of equity finance as the ratio of corporate profits (before 
tax) to the sum of corporate profits plus net interest income.  For 1990-2002, this fraction 
is 0.60
eq f = .  Equity is taxed first as corporate profits and then as dividend income.  
The statutory tax rate on corporate profits is roughly 0.35.  Because dividend income is 
highly skewed, we assume that all dividends are paid to people at the top income tax 
bracket.  Thus, for equity,  0.35 and  0.35
d π ττ == .  Debt financing avoids the corporate   41
tax but is subject to the income tax rate.  We treat debt finance as  0 and  0.35
d π ττ == . 
The overall tax rates are: 
() {} 1 0.3 0.35 1 0 0.2235
corp corp eq eq FF f f
π τ ⎡⎤ = −⋅ + ⋅⋅+ −⋅ = ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ , 
() {} 1 0 0.35 1 0.35 0.2975
d corp corp eq eq FF f f τ ⎡⎤ = −⋅ + ⋅⋅+ −⋅ = ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ . 
 
 
A.3. Data  
The data on investment by type are taken from the Underlying Detail Tables for the BEA 
National Economics Accounts.  Specifically, tables 5.4.4AU, 5.4.4BU, 5.4.5AU, 
5.4.5BU, 5.4.6AU, 5.4.6BU, 5.5.4U, 5.5.5U, and 5.5.6U.  For equipment, the investment 
categories used are on lines: 5-11, 13, 15-20, 22, 25-28, 34, 35, 37-40; for structures, the 
categories used are on lines: 4, 7, 14, 17-19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 34.  The category 
for railroad structures (see Table 6) disappears after 1997.  After 1997, railroad structures 
are included in land, which the BEA describes as “primarily consisting of railroads”. 
Data on the investment tax credit by asset type are from Dale Jorgenson.  These data are 
constructed using the methods described in Jorgenson and Yun [1991].  Data for real and 
nominal GDP, the Federal Funds Rate, the 10-year Treasury rate, the CPI and the GDP 




A.4. The Recovery of Depreciation under the U.S. Tax System 
This section provides additional details about the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System or MACRS.  For more information the reader should consult IRS Publication 946 
How to Depreciate Property.   
Businesses deduct the costs of most capital investments from taxable income in 
the years following the initial investment.  Almost all tangible assets can be depreciated 
provided that their primary use is in production.
26  In general, deductions begin the year 
the property is placed in service.  Firms may depreciate the cost of the asset as well as 
any installation fees, freight charges, and sales tax.  Thus, the bonus depreciation 
allowance applies to external and internal costs symmetrically.   
MACRS has three depreciation methods: 200 percent and 150 percent declining 
balance methods, and straight-line depreciation.  The declining balance methods are 
combinations of geometric depreciation and straight-line depreciation.  In the early phase 
of the recovery period, declining balance methods use fixed geometric depreciation rates.  
If the recovery period is R, the 200 percent annual declining balance rate is 200 
percent/R; the 150 percent declining balance rate is 150 percent/R.  Only non-farm 
property with recovery periods of 10 years or less may use the 200 percent declining 
balance method.  All farm property and all 15 and 20-year property uses the 150 percent 
declining balance rate.  Non-residential real property (business structures) and rental 
property use the straight-line method. 
                                                 
26 Computer software, patents and other intangible assets are also eligible for depreciation.  If the asset is 
only partially devoted to business activity then only a fraction of the property is depreciable.  Appendix A.4 
provides a more detailed discussion of MACRS.  For more details on depreciation in the U.S. tax system 
see IRS Publication 946.   42
These rates, together with the original cost of the capital, dictate the tax 
deductions each year until a straight-line depreciation rate (over the remaining part of the 
recovery period) exceeds the declining balance rate (in continuous time, the switch to 
straight-line depreciation would occur halfway through the assets recovery period).   
Because depreciation deductions are made at discrete points in time, MACRS 
often treats property as though it was acquired and placed in service in the middle of the 
year.  This is called a half-year convention.
27  Firms deduct half of a year’s depreciation 
in the year the property was purchased.  Thus, even though five-year properties have a 40 
percent annual MACRS depreciation rate, the firm only deducts 20 percent in the first 
year (a consequence of half-year conventions is that property with a recovery period of R 
is actually recovered over a period of R+1 years with the first and last years accounting 
for half of a year).  Table A.1 gives the exact schedule of MACRS depreciation 
deductions for various recovery periods assuming a half-year convention.  In the table, 




This appendix briefly discusses the OLS and WLS estimators used in Section VI.  Write 
ˆ B  as the vector of parameter estimates, Y as the vector of left-hand-side variables and X 
as the matrix of right hand side variables in (26) and (27).  Then, for j = I, p and for 
weighting matrix W  
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and  ˆˆ ˆ
III R Ω = ⊗Σ  and  ˆˆ ˆ
ppp R Ω = ⊗Σ .  The OLS estimator corresponds to  j WI =  and 
WLS corresponds to  ˆ diag( ) jj W = Ω for , j Ip = .   
 
                                                 
27 MACRS sometimes requires businesses to use mid-quarter or mid-month conventions. TABLE 1: RESPONSE TO A TEMPORARY INVESTMENT SUBSIDY 
 
 
Duration  Depreciation 
Rate 
Shadow Price (ϕ) 
   ξ = 0  ξ  = 0.5  ξ  = 1  ξ  = 5  ξ  = 10  ξ  = 15  ξ  = 20 
δ  =  .001  1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.998 0.997 0.996 
δ  =  .01  1.000 0.999 0.998 0.992 0.986 0.982 0.978 
δ  =  .02  1.000 0.998 0.996 0.986 0.976 0.969 0.963 
δ  =  .05  1.000 0.996 0.992 0.970 0.951 0.936 0.923 
δ  =  .10  1.000 0.992 0.985 0.945 0.911 0.885 0.864 
6 months 
δ  =  .25  1.000 0.982 0.965 0.877 0.807 0.755 0.714 
           
δ  =  .001  1.000 1.000 0.999 0.997 0.995 0.993 0.991 
δ  =  .01  1.000 0.998 0.996 0.983 0.972 0.964 0.956 
δ  =  .02  1.000 0.996 0.993 0.972 0.954 0.940 0.928 
δ  =  .05  1.000 0.992 0.984 0.941 0.906 0.878 0.855 
δ  =  .10  1.000 0.985 0.971 0.896 0.835 0.790 0.753 
1 year 
δ  =  .25  1.000 0.966 0.936 0.784 0.673 0.597 0.539 
           
δ  =  .001  1.000 0.999 0.999 0.995 0.990 0.986 0.983 
δ  =  .01  1.000 0.996 0.992 0.967 0.946 0.930 0.915 
δ  =  .02  1.000 0.992 0.985 0.946 0.912 0.886 0.864 
δ  =  .05  1.000 0.984 0.969 0.890 0.826 0.779 0.740 
δ  =  .10  1.000 0.971 0.946 0.814 0.715 0.645 0.591 
2 years 
δ  =  .25  1.000 0.941 0.891 0.659 0.515 0.428 0.368 
           
δ  =  .001  1.000 0.999 0.998 0.992 0.985 0.980 0.975 
δ  =  .01  1.000 0.993 0.988 0.952 0.922 0.898 0.878 
δ  =  .02  1.000 0.989 0.979 0.921 0.873 0.837 0.807 
δ = .05  1.000 0.976 0.956 0.845 0.760 0.698 0.649 
δ = .10  1.000 0.959 0.925 0.749 0.626 0.545 0.485 
3 years 
δ = .25  1.000 0.922 0.860 0.587 0.439 0.357 0.304 
           
δ = .001  1.000 0.986 0.972 0.884 0.806 0.749 0.704 
δ  =  .01  1.000 0.929 0.872 0.637 0.513 0.443 0.396 
δ  =  .02  1.000 0.908 0.839 0.578 0.453 0.387 0.343 
δ  =  .05  1.000 0.888 0.808 0.528 0.405 0.341 0.300 
δ  =  .10  1.000 0.879 0.794 0.506 0.384 0.322 0.282 
Permanent 
δ  =  .25  1.000 0.872 0.783 0.489 0.367 0.306 0.267 
           
Note: The table shows the equilibrium change in the shadow price of capital goods ϕ in response to 
an investment subsidy of one percent ( .01 ζ = ).  For the numerical calculations, the production 
function is  t Ak
α,  0.02 r = , and  0.35 α = .  Investment supply is given by equation (2).  
TABLE 2: RECOVERY PERIODS AND DEPRECATION METHODS BY TYPE OF CAPITAL 
 
Type of Capital  Recovery Period (R)  Tax Depreciation Rate (Method) 
Tractor units for over-the-road use, horses over 12 years old or 
racehorses with over 2 years in service  3 years  66.7% (200% DB) 
Computers & office equipment; light vehicles, buses and trucks  5 years  40.0% (200% DB) 
Miscellaneous equipment,
1 office furniture, agricultural 
equipment
2  7 years  28.6% (200% DB) 
& 21.4% (150% DB) 
Water transportation equipment (vessels and barges), single 
purpose agricultural structures
2  10 years  20.0% (200% DB) 
& 15.0% (150% DB) 
Radio towers; cable lines; pipelines; electricity generation and 
distribution systems, “land improvements” e.g. sidewalks, roads, 
canals, drainage systems, sewers, docks, bridges; engines and 
turbines.  
15 years  10.0% (150% DB) 
Farm buildings (other than single purpose structures); railroad 
structures, telephone communications, electric utilities, water 
utilities structures including dams, and canals  
20 years  7.5% (150% DB) 
Non-residential real property (office buildings, storehouses, 
warehouses, etc)  39 years
3 2.6%  (SL) 
 
 
Note:  DB is “Declining Balance;” SL is “Straight-Line.”  Source: IRS Publication 946. 
                                                 
1 Property that is not explicitly catalogued under the MACRS system is given a seven-year recovery period.  
2 All farm property uses the 150% declining balance method.  
3 Property placed in service prior to May 13, 1993 has a 31.5 year recovery period.  TABLE 3.  PRESENT VALUE OF DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES (Z) 
 
A.  z with and without the 30% and 50% bonus depreciation 
  Nominal rate = .03  Nominal rate = .05  Nominal rate = .07 
Recovery period  z  z +30%  z +50%  z  z +30%  z +50%  z  z +30%  z +50% 
3-years  0.972 0.981 0.986 0.955 0.968 0.977 0.939 0.957 0.969 
5-years  0.949 0.964 0.975 0.918 0.943 0.959 0.890 0.923 0.945 
7-years  0.927 0.949 0.964 0.884 0.919 0.942 0.846 0.892 0.923 
7-years  (150DB)  0.914 0.939 0.957 0.863 0.904 0.932 0.818 0.872 0.909 
10-years  0.896 0.927 0.948 0.837 0.886 0.919 0.786 0.850 0.893 
10-years  (150DB)  0.878 0.915 0.939 0.811 0.868 0.905 0.752 0.826 0.876 
15-years  0.824 0.877 0.912 0.733 0.813 0.867 0.659 0.761 0.829 




B.  Tax Subsidy due to the Bonus Depreciation Allowance, Percent 














3-years  0.44 0.74 0.72 1.20 0.97 1.63 
5-years  0.81 1.35 1.28 2.15 1.71 2.88 
7-years  1.15 1.92 1.79 3.02 2.36 3.99 
7-years  (150DB)  1.35 2.27 2.10 3.55 2.75 4.68 
10-years  1.62 2.73 2.48 4.20 3.20 5.45 
10-years  (150DB)  1.88 3.17 2.85 4.85 3.67 6.26 
15-years  2.66 4.52 3.91 6.70 4.89 8.42 
20-years  3.36 5.72 4.78 8.24 5.83  10.11 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on statutory MACRS recovery schedules and 0.35 corporate tax rate. TABLE 4: STRUCTURAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
 
PANEL A: Investment Equation (26) 
ξ   / ξσ  
Row Forecast  Equation  Structural 
Equation  WLS OLS  WLS  OLS 
11.64 10.30  15.42  11.03  1 Baseline  Baseline 
(2.55) (3.60)  (2.44)  (5.08) 
10.87 12.48  14.89  15.84  2  Time trend only  Baseline  (5.48) (8.58)  (5.05)  (8.16) 
21.84 16.81      3 Baseline  Time-varying 
MU(C) (4.00)  (4.73)     
22.21 20.52      4  Time trend only  Time-varying 
MU(C) (8.52)  (11.92)     
 
PANEL B: Price Equation (27) 
,1 p β   1/σ  
Row Forecast  Equation  Structural 
Equation  WLS OLS  WLS  OLS 
-2.06 -1.47  0.21  0.69  1 Baseline  Baseline  (1.50) (1.84)  (1.69)  (2.04) 
-1.39 -0.25  -0.03  0.69  2  Time trend only  Baseline  (1.33) (2.15)  (1.28)  (1.76) 
-2.62 -1.68      3 Baseline  Time-varying 
MU(C) (2.16)  (2.67)     
-1.96 -0.32      4  Time trend only  Time-varying 
MU(C) (1.68)  (2.98)     
 
 
NOTES: The baseline forecast equation specification (rows 1 and 3) includes a constant, trend, and 
two lags of real GDP, real corporate profits, type-specific real investment, type-specific real 
relative prices and type-specific ITC.  The trend only forecast equation specification (rows 2 and 
4) includes only a constant and trend.  The baseline structural specification (rows 1 and 2) uses 
HP-filtered consumption to measure aggregate marginal utility.  The time-varying MU(C)  
specification (rows 3 and 4) uses time dummies.  Estimates are by ordinary least squares (OLS) or 
weighted least squares (WLS).  Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for time-series and 




TABLE 5.  BASELINE PARAMETERS FOR SIMULATIONS 
 
Parameter Baseline  Value 
Discount factor, annual rate (β )  0.97 
Capital share (α) 0.38 
Labor supply elasticity (η )  0.50 
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption (σ ) 0.20 
Average inflation rate (π ) 0.03 
Investment supply elasticity (ξ )  15.00 
Share of government spending in GDP (g) 0.20 
Tax rate on capital earnings (
π τ )  0.22 
Tax rate on earnings distribution (
d τ )  0.30 
 TABLE 6. CAPITAL TYPES USED FOR SIMULATION.  
m  Type of Capital 
Economic 
Depreciation 
m δ  
Tax 
Depreciation




1  Construction equipment and tractors  0.17  0.40  1.38 
2  Vehicles; office and computing equipment  0.30  0.40  28.49 
3 Agricultural  equipment  0.097  0.21  1.16 
4  General equipment (incl. rail, furniture, aircraft, instruments, mining 
and oil, and household equipment)  0.100 0.29  21.66 
5  Engines and turbines  0.079  0.10  0.40 
6  Industrial buildings (incl. religious, education buildings, and 
hospitals)  0.03 0.03  11.60 
7  Farm structures; rail; and electric power structures  0.025  0.08  2.02 
8  Telephone, telegraph and misc. power and utility structures  0.04  0.10  1.62 
9  Mining, shafts and wells  0.056  0.20  1.73 
10  Residential and other structures  0.02  --  28.46 
 
Note:  Authors’ calculations based on MACRS recovery schedules.  For the calibration, these farm buildings do not include single 
purpose agricultural structures.  Single purpose agricultural structures have a 10-year recovery period and are depreciated with a 150% 
DB method under MACRS.  Farm structures other than single purpose structures are 20-year property (150% DB).  In the data, farm 
structures are aggregated into one category.  The last column gives fraction of investment since 1990 accounted for by the type.  These 
types account for 98.5 of total investment. Excluded categories are water vessels, and lodging, recreation and amusement structures. TABLE 7. SIMULATED EFFECTS OF A 50 PERCENT BONUS DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCE: ALTERNATIVE PARAMETERS 
 
Parameters GDP Employment 
  Change from Trend 
(percent) 
Change 
(billions of dollars) 




Baseline  0.158  17.4 0.147 191 
Low Investment Elasticity, ξ = 10  0.145  16.0 0.141 183 
“Adjustment Costs” ξ = 3  0.098  10.8 0.101 132 
Low distribution tax, τ 
d = 0.15  0.207 22.7    0.206  268 
High profit tax, τ 
π = 0.35  0.246  27.0 0.224 292 
High Labor Supply Elasticity, η = 1  0.215  23.6 0.226 294 
Log preferences (High IES), σ = 1  0.167  18.3 0.131 170 
Low inflation, π = 1  0.114  12.5 0.108 140 
 
Note: This table shows the results of simulating the effect of the 50% bonus depreciation provisions on 2003 GDP and employment.  
Parameters other than those specified in the table are set at their baseline values in Table 5.    
 
TABLE A.1: MACRS RECOVERY SCHEDULES BY RECOVERY PERIOD, PERCENT PER YEAR  
 
Year  3-year  5-year  7-year  10-year 15-year 20-year  27½-year 39-year
 
1  33.33 20.00 14.29 10.00  5.00  3.750 1.970  1.391 
2  44.45 32.00 24.49 18.00  9.50  7.219 3.636  2.564 
3  14.81 19.20 17.49 14.40  8.55  6.677 3.636  2.564 
4  7.41 11.52 12.49 11.52  7.70  6.177 3.636  2.564 
5    11.52 8.93 9.22 6.93 5.713  3.636 2.564 
6    5.76 8.92 7.37 6.23 5.285  3.636 2.564 
7      8.93 6.55 5.90 4.888  3.636 2.564 
8      4.46 6.55 5.90 4.522  3.636 2.564 
9        6.56 5.91 4.462  3.636 2.564 
10        6.55 5.90 4.461  3.636 2.564 
11        3.28 5.91 4.462  3.636 2.564 
12       5.90  4.461  3.636  2.564 
13       5.91  4.462  3.636  2.564 
14       5.90  4.461  3.636  2.564 
15       5.91  4.462  3.636  2.564 
16       2.95  4.461  3.636  2.564 
17        4.462  3.636  2.564 
18        4.461  3.636  2.564 
19        4.462  3.636  2.564 
20        4.461  3.636  2.564 
21        2.231  3.636  2.564 
22-27         3.636  2.564 
28         3.485  2.564 
29-39         2.564 
40         1.177 
 
Notes: 15 and 20-year property are recovered with a 150% declining balance method. The 27.5 
and 39-year property classes are recovered with a straight-line method with a half-year dating 












TABLE A.2. ECONOMIC AND MACRS DEPRECIATION BY DETAILED TYPE OF CAPITAL 
 
Type of Capital  Economic 
Depreciation 
Rate 








ˆm δ  
Computers and peripheral equipment  0.300  5  200  0.400 
Software 0.300  5  200  0.400 
Communication equipment  0.300  5  200  0.400 
Medical equipment and instruments  0.135  7  200  0.286 
Nonmedical instruments  0.135  7  200  0.286 
Photocopy and related equipment  0.180  5  200  0.400 
Office and accounting equipment  0.150  5  200  0.400 
Fabricated metal products  0.092  7  200  0.286 
Internal combustion engines  0.210  15  150  0.100 
Metalworking machinery  0.122  7  200  0.286 
Special industry machinery  0.103  7  200  0.286 
General industrial equipment  0.107  7  200  0.286 
Electrical transmission and distribution, 
industrial apparatus  0.050 7  200  0.286 
Trucks, buses, and truck trailers 0.190  5 200  0.400 
Autos 0.165  5  200  0.400 
Aircraft 0.110  7  200  0.286 
Ships and boats  0.060  10  200  0.200 
Railroad equipment  0.060  7  200  0.286 
Farm tractors  0.145  5  150  0.300 
Other agricultural machinery  0.118  7  150  0.214 
Construction tractors  0.163  5  200  0.400 
Other construction machinery  0.155  5  200  0.400 
Mining and oilfield machinery  0.150  7  200  0.286 
Service industry machinery  0.165  7  200  0.286 
Commercial, including office buildings  0.025  39  SL  0.026 
Hospitals and special care structures  0.019  39  SL  0.026 
Manufacturing structures  0.031  39  SL  0.026 
Electric structures  0.021  20  150  0.075 
Other power structures  0.024  15  150  0.100 
Communication structures  0.024  15  150  0.100 
Petroleum and natural gas  0.075  5  SL  0.200 
Mining   0.045  5  SL  0.200 
Religious structures  0.019  39  SL  0.026 
Educational structures  0.019  39  SL  0.026 
Railroad structures  0.018  20  150  0.075 
Farm structures  0.024  20  150  0.075 
 
Note: The table lists the types of investment goods in the data set used in our empirical specification.  
All rates are annual.  For the depreciation method, 200 indicates the 200 percent double declining 
balance method; 150 indicates the 150 percent declining balance method; and SL is straight line 
depreciation.  The tax depreciation rate is the declining balance rate divided by the recovery period (for 
SL it is simply the inverse of the recovery period).    
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Equation (2) – Low ξ 
(inelastic supply) 
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(elastic supply) 
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FIGURE 2: SIMULATED FORECAST ERRORS FROM BONUS DEPRECIATION POLICY 
 

































Note: Simulated response of investment (top panels) and shadow prices (lower panels) for various types of 
capital to the 30 percent (2002:2) and 50 percent (2003:3) bonus depreciation policy.  The tax depreciation 
rate ( ˆ δ ) is on the horizontal axis.  Percent deviation from steady state is on the vertical axis.  Each circle 
corresponds to approximate response to bonus depreciation based on equations (22) and (23). Solid circles 
are for capital that qualifies for bonus depreciation.  Empty circles represent unqualified capital. In panel A, 
15 ξ = . 
 








































































































































Note: The figure plots forecast errors for real investment (upper panels) and real investment prices (lower panels) by type of 
capital.  The forecast errors come from the baseline forecasting equations (24) and (25). Solid circles are types that qualify for 
bonus depreciation.  Empty circles are unqualified types.  The tax depreciation rate ( ˆ δ ) is on the horizontal axis.  








































































































































B: Investment Prices 
 
































Note:  The figures plot the implied time path of the best fitting bonus depreciation rate ( t λ ) for the 
investment data in equation (30).  The top panel controls for aggregate effects with  2
m
t C Ψ   while the 
bottom panel estimates a time-varying marginal utility term (a time dummy) which is then scaled 
across investment types by the tax term  2
m Ψ  described in the text.   
 











A: Baseline structural specification
 
 



















































Note: The figures give the simulated reactions of the model in Section II to the bonus depreciation provisions of the 2002 and 2003 
laws.  See Tables 5 and 6 for the parameters underlying the simulation.   








































































































Aggregate Investment and Consumption
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